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Abstract
We study how ￿nancial frictions and the saving rate shape the long-run e⁄ects of trade lib-
eralization on income, consumption and the distribution of wealth in ￿nancially underdeveloped
economies. In our model, regardless of whether the capital account is open or not, trade liber-
alization reduces the share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs and may well reduce steady
state consumption and income. Furthermore, trade opening is more likely to reduce steady-state
consumption and output, the higher is the level of ￿nancial development. For economies with an
open capital account, a higher saving rate also increases the likelihood that a trade liberalization
leads to a reduction in steady-state consumption and output.
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In this paper, we study how ￿nancial frictions and the saving rate shape the long-run e⁄ects of trade
liberalization on income, consumption and the distribution of wealth in ￿nancially underdeveloped
economies. We build on our previous work in Antr￿s and Caballero (2009) ￿ AC hereafter ￿ ,
where we developed a dynamic 2 ￿ 2 general equilibrium model of international trade featuring
heterogeneous ￿nancial frictions across countries and sectors. In AC, we focused on the e⁄ect of
trade liberalization on the steady state rental rate of capital and highlighted the result that in a
world with heterogeneous ￿nancial development, trade and capital mobility are complements in
￿nancially underdeveloped economies.
The goal of this paper is to describe in more detail the dynamics of the model and to derive
new results concerning the role of certain ￿nancial and macroeconomic factors in shaping these
dynamics. Our ￿rst key result is that when ￿nancial frictions are important, the standard static
gains from trade liberalization can be severely diluted over time in ￿nancially underdeveloped
economies. The reason for this is that trade integration erodes the return to entrepreneurial capital
due to competition from more developed economies, which are better able to channel funds to
their entrepreneurs. These induced changes in the distribution of wealth lead to an endogenous
tightening of credit conditions and may well result in steady state consumption and income levels
that are lower than those that would be attained without the trade liberalization.
Somewhat paradoxically, we ￿nd that trade opening is more likely to reduce steady-state con-
sumption and output, the higher is the level of ￿nancial development (provided that this level is
below the average one in the world). Furthermore, for economies with an open capital account,
a higher saving rate also increases the likelihood that trade liberalization leads to a reduction in
steady-state consumption and output.
Our work is related to the vast literature introducing ￿nancial frictions in international ￿nance
and international trade models (see AC and the references therein). A particularly related paper
is Chesnokova (2009) who argues that opening an economy to trade can result in welfare reducing
deindustrialization when agents are subject to credit constraints. More broadly, our work is related
the second-best literature in international trade (see Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our small open-economy
model and characterize its equilibrium. In section 3, we study the e⁄ects of a partial trade liberal-
ization for the case in which the capital account is closed, while in section 4 we repeat the exercise
for an economy with an open account. We o⁄er some concluding remarks in section 5.
2 A Small-Open Economy with Financial Frictions
Time evolves continuously. In￿nitesimal agents are born at a rate ￿ per unit of time and die at
the same rate; population mass is constant and equal to L. All agents are endowed with one unit
of labor services which they supply inelastically to the market. Agents save all their income and
consume only when they (are about to) die. Thus, if Wt denotes aggregate savings accumulated
1up to date t, then aggregate consumption at time t is ￿Wt, and ￿ is inversely related to the
aggregate propensity to save of this economy. The economy produces two goods (1 and 2) and
agents consuming at time t allocate their spending between these two consumption in a way that
maximizes the following instantaneous utility function
U =
￿
C1
￿
￿￿ ￿
C2
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿￿
. (1)
Physical capital is the only store of value in the economy and is freely tradable within borders.
We will later consider the case in which it is also tradable across borders. We assume that the
initial stock of capital is equal to K0, that there is no depreciation, and that new physical capital
can be produced by combining goods 1 and 2 according to the same utility aggregator in (1). As a
result, the relative price of capital qt is equal to the ideal price index, qt = (p1)
￿ (p2)
1￿￿, which we
choose as our numeraire. We thus have qt = 1 and Wt = Kt at all times.
Production in both sectors combines physical capital and labor according to:
Yi = Z (Ki)
￿ (Li)
1￿￿ , i = 1;2, (2)
where Ki and Li are the amounts of capital and labor employed in sector i, and Z is a Hicks-neutral
productivity parameter. Although technology is identical in both sectors, we think of production in
sector 1 as being relatively more complex, in the sense that at any point in time t, only a fraction
￿ of the population knows how to operate that production technology. We refer to these agents as
entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, these agents will rent capital from the rest of the population, so we
refer to these other agents as rentiers.
Goods and labor markets are perfectly competitive and factors of production are freely mobile
across sectors. The distinctive feature of our model is that the capital market has a friction and
that the ￿nancial friction has an asymmetric e⁄ect in the two sectors. In particular, we assume
that ￿nancial contracting in sector 2 is perfect in the sense that any agent in the economy can hire
any desired amount of capital at the equilibrium rental rate ￿ provided that capital is used in sector
2.
Conversely, there is a ￿nancial friction in sector 1. Because the production process is partic-
ularly complex, a problem of asymmetric information arises and rentiers are willing to lend to
entrepreneurs only an amount proportional to the wealth of entrepreneurs (rather than an unlim-
ited amount). Provided that ￿nancial constraints bind, in equilibrium entrepreneurs always invest
their capital in sector 1, so the allocation of capital to sector 1 is given by
K1;t = ￿stKt, (3)
where ￿ > 1 and st is the share of wealth (and thus of the physical capital stock) in the hands
of entrepreneurs. In AC, we developed microfoundations for this constraint and we mapped the
parameter ￿ to institutional features of the economy. We interpret a larger value of ￿ as re￿ ecting
2a more developed ￿nancial system. In AC we also showed that a su¢ cient condition for ￿nancial
constraints to bind (even in the steady state) is ￿ > ￿￿, so we make this parametric assumption
throughout the text.
For simplicity, we assume that the economy is small in world markets and faces exogenously
given prices of goods 1 and 2 (p1, p2). Furthermore, as shown in AC, in our setup, as long
as ￿nancial constraints bind in world markets, we have ￿ ￿ p2=p1 < 1. Intuitively, ￿nancial
constraints depress the relative supply of good 1 in world markets and this leads to a depressed
relative price for good 2 (in the absence of ￿nancial frictions, we naturally have ￿ = 1).
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium of this dynamic economy. There are two state
variables in the model: the stock of physical capital Kt and the share of wealth st in the hands of
entrepreneurs. We will also be concerned with the determination of four prices: the wage rate (wt),
the rental rate of capital (￿t), the return to entrepreneurial capital (Rt) and the interest rate (rt).
Although physical capital is tradable, we will assume that entrepreneurial ability is inalienable,
and thus entrepreneurial rents are not capitalizable (i.e., only entrepreneurs can enjoy them). Given
that the price of capital is always equal to 1, the ￿nancial return on holding a unit of capital (or
interest rate) is simply equal to the rental rate of capital ￿t so rt = ￿t. Note that surviving agents
spend all their income in buying capital and rentiers are always the marginal buyers.
In order to characterize the dynamic path of this economy, note that aggregate savings of each
group (entrepreneurs e and rentiers r) decrease with consumption, and increase with labor income,
entrepreneurial rents (if any) and the return on accumulated savings:
_ Ke
t = ￿￿stKt + ￿wtL + stRtKt; (4)
_ Kr
t = ￿￿(1 ￿ st)Kt + (1 ￿ ￿)wtL + ￿t (1 ￿ st)Kt: (5)
Manipulating these expressions we obtain a law of motion for capital,
_ Kt = ￿tKt + wtL + (Rt ￿ ￿t)stKt ￿ ￿Kt, (6)
and a law of motion for the share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs
_ st =
(1 ￿ st)(Rt ￿ ￿t)stKt ￿ (st ￿ ￿)wtL
Kt
, (7)
both in terms of factor prices.
Equilibrium factor prices can in turn be obtained by (a) equating the wage rate to the value of
the marginal product of labor in each sector, (b) imposing factor market clearing and (c) equating
the value of the marginal product of capital in sector 1 and 2 to ￿t (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ + Rt=￿ and ￿t,
respectively (see AC for details). De￿ning
￿(st;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿st)￿1=￿ + ￿st < 1 (8)
3these steps yield:
wt =
(1 ￿ ￿)Z
￿1￿￿
￿
￿(st;￿)
Kt
L
￿￿
(9)
￿t = ￿Z￿1=￿+￿￿1
￿
￿(st;￿)
Kt
L
￿￿￿1
Rt =
￿
1 + ￿
￿
￿￿1=￿ ￿ 1
￿￿
￿t:
Plugging these expressions back in (6) and (7), we can ￿nally express the dynamic path of Kt
and st in terms of these two state variables and exogenous parameters:
_ Kt =
Z
￿1￿￿ (￿(st;￿)Kt)
￿ L1￿￿ ￿ ￿Kt
and
_ st =
h
￿(1 ￿ st)
￿
1 ￿ ￿1=￿
￿
￿st ￿ (st ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿(st;￿)
i Z
￿1￿￿
￿
￿(st;￿)
Kt
L
￿￿￿1
.
As shown in AC, this system is stable and, regardless of the initial values K0 and s0, the
economy converges to a steady state implicitly de￿ned by the following expressions:
K￿ =
￿
Z
￿
(￿(s￿;￿))
￿
￿1￿￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
L (10)
￿(1 ￿ s￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿1=￿￿
￿s￿
￿(s￿;￿)
= (s￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿), (11)
and with associated factor prices:
w￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
Z
￿
(￿(s￿;￿))
￿
￿1￿￿
￿1=(1￿￿)
(12)
￿￿ = ￿￿
￿1=￿
￿(s￿;￿)
(13)
R￿ =
￿
1 + ￿
￿
￿￿1=￿ ￿ 1
￿￿
￿￿: (14)
3 A Trade Liberalization with a Closed Capital Account
Suppose now that at some time T > 0, this economy experiences an unexpected trade liberalization.
We think of this economy as being relatively ￿nancially underdeveloped and so, as argued in AC,
a reduction in trade barriers brings about an increase in the relative price of this economy￿ s export
sector, which is the less ￿nancially dependent sector 2. More formally, in AC we showed that as
long as ￿ is lower than the rest of the world￿ s average level of ￿nancial development, a fall in trade
barriers increases the relative price ￿ faced by that country.
4In AC, we focused on a comparison of steady states for di⁄erent values of ￿ and emphasized the
fact that trade liberalization increases the steady-state value of the rental rate of capital ￿￿. This
can be easily veri￿ed by combining equations (8), (11) and (13) and is the result of two e⁄ects.
First, ￿￿ increases with ￿ holding constant s￿. This is the impact e⁄ect of trade liberalization
and is the e⁄ect emphasized in AC. The result is intuitive. The increased trade integration allows
South to further specialize in its comparative advantage sector, which is the sector without ￿nancial
frictions. The resulting shift of labor to sector 2 increases the return to capital in that sector (i.e.,
the rental rate of capital). The second channel through which trade liberalization a⁄ects the rental
rate of capital is through its e⁄ect on the distribution of wealth in the economy. This is not
an impact e⁄ect but rather a dynamic e⁄ect. Because of the higher rental rate and the reduced
entrepreneurial return, the share of capital st in the hands of entrepreneurs gradually falls through
time and settles at a steady state level that is decreasing in ￿. Because the rental rate is decreasing
in st (see equation (13)), we have that this endogenous fall in st leads to further increases in the
rental rate along the transition path.
The dynamic e⁄ect has important consequences for the e⁄ects of trade liberalization on the
remaining factor prices as well as on some of the aggregates of the economy. The reason is that
the economy is ine¢ cient since it is unable to allocate enough resources to the complex sector 1.
By reducing the share of capital in the hands of entrepreneurs, trade liberalization aggravates this
problem and quali￿es the standard arguments in favor of trade liberalization.
A ￿rst illustration of the importance of the endogenous decline in entrepreneurial rents (and
hence in their share of capital) comes from the behavior of wages following the trade liberalization
period. Plugging expression (8) into equation (9) and di⁄erentiating, it is straightforward to verify
that wages increase on impact following the reduction in trade barriers. Nevertheless, the subse-
quent fall in st leads to a gradual fall of the wage rate from its higher level achieved on impact.
Hence, the gradual tightening of credit conditions erodes the static wage gains from trade liberal-
ization. Whether wages settle at a level that is higher or lower than before the trade liberalization
depends crucially on how the term
￿(￿) ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿s￿ (￿))￿1=￿ + ￿s￿ (￿)
￿￿
￿1￿￿
varies with ￿ (see equation (12)). The total derivative of ￿(￿) with respect to ￿ is also crucial
for signing the long-run e⁄ects of trade liberalization on the steady-state levels of the economy￿ s
aggregate capital-labor ratio, aggregate output and aggregate consumption.1 Di⁄erentiation then
allows us to conclude:
Proposition 1 Consider an economy with a closed capital account and a level of ￿nancial develop-
ment below the average world level. Then, other things equal, a trade liberalization is more likely to
1See equation (10) for the aggregate capital-labor ratio. Aggregate consumption is simply equal to ￿Kt at any
point in time. Finally, aggregate output equals factor payments and thus Yt = wtLt + ￿tKt + st (Rt ￿ ￿t)Kt =
Z (￿(st;￿)Kt)
￿ L
1￿￿=￿
1￿￿, where remember that ￿(st;￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿st)￿
1=￿ + ￿st.
5reduce steady-state wages, consumption and output the higher is the level of ￿nancial development
￿.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To understand this result, remember that trade liberalization has two e⁄ects in the model. On
the one hand, it generates the standard static gains from trade resulting from an improvement in the
economy￿ s terms of trade. This gain is naturally higher for economies with ￿nancial development
levels farther away from the average world one. This explains why the positive impact e⁄ect of
trade liberalization on wages, consumption and output is lower the higher is ￿. On the other hand,
trade liberalization leads to a compression in the economy￿ s wealth distribution and this makes
￿nancial frictions more binding. This negative e⁄ect is more pronounced in economies that had
less binding ￿nancial constraints to begin with (see Appendix for details). Overall, the long-run
e⁄ects of trade liberalization on wages, consumption and output may well be negative, and this is
more likely to be so for economies with larger levels of ￿ (with ￿ being lower than the average level
of ￿nancial development in the world).
Figure 1 illustrates the result in Proposition 1 for an economy with the following parameter
values: ￿ = 1=3, ￿ = :2, ￿ = :75;￿ = :1; L = 1; Z = 1. The experiment is an increase of the relative
price ￿ from 0:7 to 0:8 in period 10.2 The main di⁄erence between panels A and B is that the level of
￿nancial development is lower in panel A (￿ = 1:1) than in panel B (￿ = 1:4). Figure 1 then con￿rms
that the gains from trade liberalization are much more nuanced for economies with higher levels
of ￿ (provided that ￿ is below the world average level of ￿nancial development). In particular,
trade liberalization generates a jump in income and capital growth, but the subsequent income
and capital growth paths are below those of an economy not experiencing the trade liberalization
episode.
4 A Trade Liberalization with an Open Capital Account
So far we have been assuming that the country is linked to the world economy only through the
goods market. Consider now the case in which the country undergoes a trade liberalization while
having an open capital account. In such a case, the dynamics of the domestically owned capital
stock Kt and the share st of this capital in the hands of entrepreneurs continue to be characterized
by equations (6) and (7) above, but the determination of factor prices is now quite di⁄erent.
First, note that the real rental rate of capital of this small open economy will be pinned down
by the world rental rate. More precisely, rentier capital will move across borders to ensure that its
return is equated worldwide. Denoting the net capital position of the country by Ft (where Ft can
be negative), we have that at any point in time,
￿t = ￿Z￿￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿st)Kt + Ft
L ￿ L1t
￿￿￿1
= ￿W,
2It can be veri￿ed that our choice of parameters implies that the world economy￿ s level of ￿ is larger than 1:4.
These parameter choices also ensure that the autarky relative prices of the economies being studied are below 0:7.
6where L ￿ L1t is the economy￿ s allocation of labor to sector 2. For simplicity, we assume that
the world rental rate is time-invariant. The above expression indicates that the capital-labor ratio
in sector 2 is pinned down by the world rental rate and time-invariant parameters, which in turn
implies that the wage rate is also independent of local conditions (and time invariant):
wt =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿Z￿￿
￿W
￿1=(1￿￿)
￿W.
Finally, the return to entrepreneurial capital is also time-invariant, and as before is given by
Rt =
￿
1 + ￿
￿
￿￿1=￿ ￿ 1
￿￿
￿W.
Given these expressions for factor prices, it is apparent that a process of trade liberalization
raises the wage rate, reduces the return to entrepreneurial capital, and leaves the rental rate of
capital unchanged. Furthermore, factor prices jump to their new level on impact and remain at
that level thereafter. How is aggregate income a⁄ected by the trade liberalization? As in the case
with a closed capital account, one can show that an increase in ￿ always increases aggregate income
in the economy with an autarky relative price lower than the world relative price ￿W.3
The fact that factor prices remain constant after the trade liberalization episode does not imply
that the economy does not feature interesting dynamics after the shock. In particular, the impact
changes on factor prices will a⁄ect aggregate income, the incentives of the economy to invest as well
as the wealth accumulation paths of entrepreneurs and rentiers. Plugging the above expressions for
factor prices into (6) and (7), and solving for the steady state, we obtain
K￿ =
1￿￿
￿
￿
￿Z￿￿
￿W
￿1=(1￿￿)
￿W
￿
￿ ￿ ￿W￿
￿
1 ￿
￿￿(￿￿1=￿￿1)￿W
￿￿￿W￿￿￿W(1￿￿)(￿￿1=￿￿1)
￿L,
and
s￿ =
￿
￿ ￿ ￿W￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿W ￿ ￿￿W (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿￿1=￿ ￿ 1
￿.
As in the closed capital account case, it is clear that a process of trade liberalization will reduce s￿.
The e⁄ect on the steady-state capital stock (and thus on the steady state consumption and income
3A small complication arises from the fact that it is now theoretically possible that an economy with a level of
￿nancial development below the world average level of ￿ may feature an autarky relative price ￿ above the world one.
The reason for this is that if the economy faces a su¢ ciently high world rental rate, rentier capital will to a large
extent be employed abroad and domestic production in sector 2 will be relatively low (hence putting upward pressure
on ￿). Still, such an economy will also bene￿t from trade liberalization because trade opening would then lead to a
decline in ￿ and such a decline is always welfare enhancing for an economy with an autarky relative price above the
world one.
7levels) is more complicated and crucially depends on the term:
￿(￿) ￿
(￿￿)
1=(1￿￿)
￿
1 ￿
￿￿(￿￿1=￿￿1)￿W
￿￿￿W￿￿￿W(1￿￿)(￿￿1=￿￿1)
￿.
Straightforward di⁄erentiation yields the following result:
Proposition 2 Consider an economy with an open capital account and an autarky relative price
of good 2 below the world relative price. Then, other things equal, a trade liberalization is more
likely to reduce steady-state consumption and output, the higher is the level of ￿nancial development
￿and the propensity to save 1 ￿ ￿.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition behind the result regarding the level of ￿nancial development is similar to the
one explained above for the case of a closed capital account. The main novelty of Proposition 2, is
that the propensity of the economy to save is now also an important determinant of whether trade
liberalization increases or decreases steady state consumption and income. The reason for this is
related to the negative e⁄ect of trade opening on the share of wealth in the hands of entrepreneurs.
Economies with high saving rates (low levels of ￿) tend to accumulate higher levels of entrepreneurial
capital income relative to labor income, and thus the negative e⁄ect of trade on the share s￿ is
particularly harmful for those economies. Why does the saving rate matter with an open capital
account but not with a closed capital account? In the latter case, factor prices are a function of
the capital stock in the economy and this leads to a ratio of entrepreneurial capital income to labor
income that is independent of the savings rate (see equation (11)). Although this feature of our
closed capital account model seems related to our Cobb-Douglas assumptions on production, the
general point is that the distribution of wealth will be much more responsive to the savings rate in
economies where factor prices are pinned down by international markets (as is the case of our open
capital account variant of the model).
As our above discussion suggests, the key behind the interaction between the saving rate and
the sign of the gains from trade relates to the e⁄ect of savings behavior on the share of wealth
in the hands of entrepreneurs. It is naturally the case that the more that entrepreneurs save, the
more wealth they will accumulate relative to the other agents in the economy and the larger is the
welfare loss associated with the erosion of these agents￿rents. Nevertheless, a higher propensity to
save by rentiers should have the opposite e⁄ect on the share s￿. A simple extension of our model
that incorporates distinct savings parameters ￿e and ￿r for entrepreneurs and rentiers con￿rms this
intuition (details available upon request). In our model, the e⁄ect of the parameter ￿e dominates
that of ￿r, but it is important to bear in mind these o⁄setting e⁄ects in empirical exercises that
are able to identify them separately.
Figure 2 illustrates the result in Proposition 2 for an economy with the same parameters as in
Figure 1: (￿ = 1=3, ￿ = :2, ￿ = :75, L = 1, Z = 1), while we set ￿ = 1:25 and ￿W = 0:014. The
8experiment is an increase of the relative price ￿ from 0:7 to 0:75, and panels A and B correspond to
the cases in which ￿ = 0:1 and ￿ = 0:075, respectively. As is clear from the Figure and consistent
with Proposition 2, the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on steady-state income and consumption is
negative for a su¢ ciently low value of ￿ (high savings rate).
5 Concluding Remarks
Our model illustrates that the long-run e⁄ects of trade liberalization crucially depend on the level
of ￿nancial frictions and the saving rate. Our model is highly stylized so it is important to bear
in mind some of the limitations in our analysis. First, our result regarding the role of the level of
￿nancial development in a⁄ecting the outcome of the trade liberalization naturally depends on the
way we have modeled ￿nancial constraints. For instance, in our model trade opening tightens credit
constraints by reducing wealth inequality, but alternative frameworks might predict a negative link
between wealth inequality and ￿nancial frictions (see Banerjee and Du￿ o, 2003, for more on this).
Second, our result regarding the role of the saving rate is derived from a particularly stylized
modelling of intertemporal substitution in consumption, and also seems to be particularly tied to
the propensity to save of entrepreneurs. Future research should shed light on the robustness of our
results in richer and more realistic frameworks.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
It proves simpler to rede￿ne the function ￿(￿) as
￿(￿) =
￿
(1 ￿ x(￿))￿1=￿ + x(￿)
￿￿
￿1￿￿
where x(￿) = ￿s￿ (￿). Note then that
@￿(￿)
@￿
=
￿
￿￿1=￿ + ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿1=￿￿
￿
@x(￿)
@￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿1=￿￿￿
x(￿)
￿
￿2￿￿ ￿
(1 ￿ x(￿))￿1=￿ + x(￿)
￿1￿￿
9and hence, it is positive if and only if
￿￿1=￿ + ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿1=￿
￿
￿
@x(￿)
@￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿1=￿
￿￿
x(￿) > 0. (15)
But it is straightforward to show that the left-hand-side of this inequality is decreasing in ￿. Solving for s
in (11) and multiplying by ￿, we have
x(q;￿) =
(￿￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(q ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)￿)) +
q
(￿￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(q ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)￿))
2 + 4￿(1 ￿ q)q￿(1 ￿ ￿)
2(1 ￿ q)
,
where q ￿ ￿1=￿. In AC we showed that x(q;￿)is increasing in ￿ and we next note that
@x(q)
@q is decreasing
in ￿:
@2x
@q@￿
= ￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 q￿￿￿
￿
(￿￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(q ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)￿))
2 + 4￿(1 ￿ q)q￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿3=2 < 0.
It follows then that the larger ￿ is, the harder it is that inequality (15) holds.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
Simple di⁄erentiation indicates that ￿0 (￿) > 0 if and only if
￿
1 ￿ ￿
 
￿ ￿ ￿
W
￿
￿￿1=￿ ￿ 1
￿ ￿ ￿￿
W
!
￿
1
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
W
￿
￿￿￿
W
￿￿￿W
(￿￿1=￿￿1) ￿ ￿￿
W (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1=￿
￿
￿￿1=￿ ￿ 1
￿2 > 0.
Notice that the left-hand-side is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in ￿. Hence, the inequality is more likely to
hold the lower is ￿ and the larger is ￿.
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Figure 1. Trade Liberalization and Financial Development
A. Trade Liberalization for ￿ = 0:1
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Figure 2. Trade Liberalization and the Saving Rate
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